Building a bridgeâ€”an archeologist's perspective on the evolution of causal cognition by Miriam N. Haidle
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY ARTICLE
published: 17 December 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01472
Building a bridge—an archeologist’s perspective on the
evolution of causal cognition
Miriam N. Haidle1,2*
1 Research Center “The Role of Culture in Early Expansions of Humans” of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Senckenberg Research Institute,
Frankfurt, Germany
2 Ältere Urgeschichte und Quartärökologie, Institut für Ur- und Frühgeschichte und Archäologie des Mittelalters, Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, Germany
Edited by:
Andrea Bender, University of
Bergen, Norway
Reviewed by:
Giovanni Bennardo, Northern Illinois
University, USA
Karenleigh Anne Overmann,
University of Oxford, UK
Daniel Hanus, Max Planck Institute,
Germany
*Correspondence:
Miriam N. Haidle, Research Center
“The Role of Culture in Early
Expansions of Humans” of the







The cognitive capacities of fossil humans cannot be studied directly. Taking the evolution
of causal cognition as an example this article demonstrates the use of bridging arguments
from archeological finds as starting point via identification/classification, behavioral
reconstructions, and cognitive interpretations to psychological models. Generally, tool
use is linked to some causal understanding/agent construal as the tool broadens the
subject’s specific capabilities by adding new characters to its action sphere. In human
evolution, the distance between the primarily perceived problem and the solution
satisfying this need increased markedly: from simple causal relations to effective chaining
in secondary/modular tool use, and further to the use of composite tools, complementary
tool sets and notional tools. This article describes the evolution of human tool behavior
from the perspective of problem-solution-distance and discusses the implications for a
linked development of causal cognition.
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There are no data available about past human cognition. But if
you want to learn something about the causal cognition of past
human populations and its evolution you can look for past behav-
ioral evidence. However, there are no direct data available about
past human behavior. If you want to learn something about what
people did, which knowledge and skills they had and which deci-
sions they made, you should examine the material remains of the
past behavior. This is what archeologists are dealing with. The
archeological record represents materialized aspects of behavior.
However, also within its limits this narrow record is not compre-
hensive. It is restricted by processes of embedding in the soil, by
preservation over thousands or even millions of years, by dis-
covery and the recognition of the significance, by the way of
documentation of the find itself and of its context. If everything
went well, you still look only at a piece of stone or wood with
traces of manipulation in association with other such objects.
The object does not speak for itself. Archeologists try to give
the artifacts voices through interpretations, which depend on
the incorporated knowledge about similar finds, analogies and/or
differential diagnoses and their context, but also on current sci-
entific paradigms and on individual experiences and world views.
Sometimes the interpretations can or could be falsified, but as
long as adequate evidence is lacking the quality of an interpreta-
tion relies on the simplicity of the argument and its plausibility in
scientific standards. This is a possible starting point fromwhich to
explore the evolution of causal cognition. What archeologists can
contribute in detail to bridge the gap between material remains
of past human behavior and insights in the cognitive background
will be discussed in the following explanation.
BUILDING A BRIDGE—STRUCTURAL DESIGN
As explained above, the archeological record does not provide
direct insight into the behavior of past hominins, just as artifacts
do not give direct evidence on the (causal) cognition underlying
the material behavior. Archeological assessments of prehistoric
cognition must rest on a series of bridging arguments (Wynn,
2009; Botha, 2010; Wadley, 2013) (Figure 1). For example, a
fragmented piece of stone with traces of modification (data A)
represents the starting point, the “safe bank.” This object can be
identified as part of a composite spear (interpretation C) using
artifact attributes such as metric dimensions, weight, and func-
tional interpretations based on the manageability for different
purposes, traces of possible use and recent analogies (bridging
arguments B). Assuming that the bridge (A–B–C) is correct, we
can infer the activities needed to produce such a composite spear
the stone point was a part of, how the activities were organized
and what artisans had to know, conceive and do, to accomplish
their goals (interpretation E). This interpretation is developed
with the help of technological evidence, experiments and, again,
ethnographic analogies (bridging arguments D). Assuming that
the bridges (A–B–C–D–E) are correct, a third group of bridg-
ing arguments (F) about the cognitive systems underpinning the
activity can then lead to cognitive interpretations (G). These are
linked by further bridging arguments (H) to psychological models
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FIGURE 1 | Bridging arguments: from archeological data to
psychological models.
(I). Tools don’t speak for themselves, but have to be interpreted
with theories of behavior. The resulting interpretations are pillars
from which, with the help of explicit theories of cognition, the
platform of probable cognitive requirements of the past behavior
can be reached (Garofoli and Haidle, 2014).
BUILDING THE BRIDGE—RAWMATERIAL
The data on which the bridging arguments concerning the evo-
lution of causal cognition rest are tools manufactured and used
by animals today as well as by past and recent hominins. Tools
are defined here “as freely movable objects that are used in a con-
trolled manner with hands, feet, beaks, mouths, trunks, and tails
as an extension of these in order to change the form, position,
or condition of another object, organism, or the user himself”
(Haidle, 2012, pp. 147–148). Because of their extra-corporal and
as such, object status and general materiality tools represent
a perfect raw material through which to explore past human
behavior. They are materialized products of behavior, have been
documented in numerous animal species, mainly in birds and
mammals and especially in primates (Beck, 1980), and form the
majority of the archeological record.
But tools are also behavioral media; they are deployed in
situations in which the subject’s capabilities are insufficient or
inadequate to cause an effect–that is to change the status (form,
position, condition) of the subject itself or another object. The
subject operates the tool as causal agens with the implicit inten-
tion that it causes an effect. Although it is the subject that initiates
and controls the action of the tool, it is the tool and its specific
qualities that produce a change in form, position, or condition
of the target; therefore, and in this context, the tool is regarded
as an agent with active potential. A chimpanzee opens a nut with
a hammerstone (Boesch and Boesch, 1984): the animal handles
an agens that she selected from the environment and that pos-
sesses qualities making it more capable than herself to solve her
problem. A New Caledonian crow uses a modified twig to extract
insects from holes in dead wood (Hunt, 1996): the agens–chosen,
modified and manipulated by the animal–has a specific effect on
the desired object; it causes a change of status of the prey. Tool
behavior deals with this form of agents/agens and effects, and thus
it is a perfect starting point to examine the unfolding of causality-
based behavior in human evolution in comparison to the faculties
of recent animals.
Additionally, tool behavior allows the search for a cognitive
background (cf. McCormack et al., 2011). There are few exam-
ples of tool use in animal behavior which are probably triggered
mainly or exclusively by instincts such as the use of a hammering
device by wasps of the genus Ammophila and Sphex to close their
breeding cavern, or ant lions throwing sand to let prey slide into a
sand pit (Beck, 1980).Most cases of tool behavior seem to bemore
or less selective and flexible (cf. Seed and Byrne, 2010). Although
often an inborn tendency to manipulate objects can be observed
in tool-using species, the specific tool behaviors are acquired in
an individual or social learning process not only in how a tool is
applied, but also why this item serves as a tool to solve a prob-
lem better than another item. Causal reasoning as the ability to
identify the relationship between causes (in tool behavior: tools
as agents/agens) and effects (the change of the status of an object
on which the tool is applied) is fundamental to conceptualize tool
use. Goswami and Brown state that: “· · · the conceptual structure
may be heavily dependent on causal relations, with natural con-
cepts always needing to be embedded in causal theories to have
real meaning or inductive power” (Goswami and Brown, 1989, p.
70; see also Keil, 2006). To obtain the meaning as hammer a stone
needs to be embedded in causal theories about hard and heavy
items and their potential effect to open nuts. If the hammer stone
solution is not only used in one specific problem-solution setting,
but also transferred to other problems than nut-cracking, even
a broader causal theory (and analogical reasoning) is necessary.
And the causal theory has to be extended further in the chaining
of several tools and their effects as it is typical for human tool
behavior. Homo heidelbergensis produced and applied different
stone tools to shape a wooden thrusting spear to hunt for horses:
300,000 years ago humans made heavy-duty tools and sharp flake
tools and used them to fell small trees; remove the bark, branches
and twigs; optimize the form (possibly also with the help of fire
and water); and smooth the surface in a process probably lasting
several days (Thieme, 1997; Haidle, 2010). The process of trans-
forming a small tree into a hunting gear with the help of different
tools depends on causal understanding–that is the development
of a functional theory about physical properties of raw materials
and tools and the mechanisms that change the status of the tar-
get. Besides applying different agents/agens in a chain of effects in
order to receive a dietary income, the human being had to control
the impulses, inhibit spontaneous reactions, learn individually as
well as in social and historical contexts, and plan the activities
to gain a delayed profit. The manufacture and use of tools are
determined by several cognitive aspects, including different levels
of causal reasoning, and are commonly reproduced culturally. As
such elements of behavior, tools are well suited to build the bridge
to reach into the blackbox of past human cognition.
BUILDING THE BRIDGE—CONSTRUCTIONWORK
Archeologists have to interpret their raw data, the archeological
finds, with the help of bridging arguments (A–B–C) to proceed in
further steps with the reconstruction of the activities, knowledge,
and conceptions behind the manufacture and use of the tools
(C–D–E). The studies of animal tool behavior begin at a differ-
ent point as most of the raw data stem from direct, though often
fragmented or anecdotic observations of an animal’s practice
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with a certain tool. Ethologists mainly start at C, and the bridge
(C–D–E) has to be reconstructed only partially. To parallelize
the bridges of different archeological artifacts and of animal tool
behavior the data have to be made comparable. To represent the
individual bridges in a contrastable way the underlying percep-
tions and behavior in the process of manufacture and use can be
coded in cognigrams and effective chains (see e.g., Haidle, 2010,
2012; Lombard and Haidle, 2012; Hunt et al., 2013). This method
is based on the problem-solution distance approach, which origi-
nates in the comparative research of Wolfgang Köhler (1926) and
takes each tool behavior as an extension of a simple and direct
way from need to satisfaction. While a hungry sheep has only to
bend the neck to feed on grass, a chimpanzee with appetite for
termites has to find or produce an appropriate probe to extract
the insects from their mount to appease her hunger. The use of a
tool incorporates a moment of inhibition of the impulse to satisfy
a need as quickly as possible; the distance between a problem and
its solution is increased.
The extension of the perception of a need and the following
actions can be systematically coded and illustrated in cognigrams
(Figure 2). Starting with the subject’s perception of a basic need,
a line of subsequent problems is perceived, opening new attention
foci, which are acted upon to satisfy the basic need. The attention
foci can be classified as active if they are actively controlled by the
subject and act upon other foci. They can encompass the subject
itself or the tools. In contrast, passive foci are objects that are acted
upon or locations. Returning to the examples of the sheep and the
chimpanzee the method becomes clear. The sheep (subject) feels
hungry (basic need, first attention focus) and wants to eat some
grass (second attention focus), bends the neck (action 1) to rip
off the grass (action 2) to feed on (action 3) to become full (sat-
isfaction of need) (Figure 3). While the grazing-sheep example
describes a basic problem-solution distance with the subject as
the only agent, the grass as the object and bending the neck and
grazing as necessary actions, tool behavior always represents an
extension of the problem-solution distance with at least one more
active attention focus (the tool) with a certain effect. If the chim-
panzee (subject) feels hungry (basic need, first attention focus)
and wants to feed on termites (second attention focus), the animal
looks for an adequate location (third attention focus), perceives
the additional need of a probe (fourth attention focus), which
has to be searched for (action 1), obtained (action 2), and trans-
ported to the termite mount (action 3), to insert it into holes of
the mount (action 4) to catch the insects (action 5), which cling
to the probe (effect of tool), to strip them off the tool (action 6),
and to feed on (action 7) to become full (satisfaction of need)
(Figure 4).
In cognigrams, the different elements of a behavior are broken
down by active and passive attention foci (subject, tools, objects,
locations), by perceptions of need opening the attention foci, by
actions within or directed to an attention focus, by effects of
attention foci on other attention foci, and by phases–clusters of
actions that have to be executed as a group or, if interrupted,
started again with the first action of the phase. A crucial point
for the comparison of behaviors is an equivalent starting point
(basic need) and the tracking of all elements including actual
FIGURE 2 | Graphic elements of a cognigram.
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1472 | 3
Haidle An archeologist’s perspective on the evolution of causal cognition
or probable interruptions until the final satisfaction of the basic
need. The cracking of nuts with a hammerstone by chimpanzees
is not directly comparable with the production of a simple stone
tool with a hammerstone by a hominin, because the manufacture
of the stone tool is only part of a process to fulfill a basic need,
which can be the satisfaction of hunger or defense, for example
(cf. Haidle, 2010). If tool behavior includes several tools with dif-
ferent effects to fulfill a need, the cognigrams can be simplified to
effective chains that represent only the attention foci of the behav-
ior and the effects they have on each other (Figure 5) (Lombard
and Haidle, 2012). Cognigrams and effective chains, however, are
only as good as the reconstructions of the behavior they illustrate.
Cognigrams therefore consist a) of a formalized description of
FIGURE 3 | Cognigram depicting the problem-solving behavior of a
sheep grazing to satisfy the basic need “hunger.”
the reconstruction of the behavior with the elements in chrono-
logical order of appearance and b) of a graphical representation.
The bridging arguments (D) that lead to the interpretation of the
behavioral background (E) shown in the cognigrams are given
in a reference section explaining the background and listing the
sources.
The reconstruction of the behavioral elements contributing to
the overall picture of a certain problem-solution unit can be more
or less detailed and can vary. Even descriptions of direct obser-
vations of a problem-solution unit can identify different details,
e.g., in problem perceptions and actions, and variegate them by
splitting or lumping; the more so do reconstructions based on
archeological finds. The following options A, B, and C of the
grazing-sheep case exemplify how different the descriptions can
be even in such a simple instance.
Option A
1. First attention focus, basic need: the sheep (subject) feels
hungry
2. Second attention focus: the sheep identifies edible plants
(object)
3. Action 1: the sheep bends the neck· · ·
4. Action 2: rips off the plants· · ·
5. Action 3: feeds on them · · ·
6. Action 4: and becomes full (satisfaction of need).
Option B (shortened version)
1. First attention focus, basic need: the sheep (subject) feels
hungry
FIGURE 4 | Cognigram depicting the problem-solving behavior of a chimpanzee using a probe to feed on termites to satisfy the basic need “hunger.”
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FIGURE 5 | Simplifying a complex set of behaviors. The effective chain
depicts agents (tools in boxes, raw materials and intermediate products
without boxes) and effects (arrows, plus signs, and curly braces) and
summarizes the combination of more than two dozen behavioral modules in
the manufacture and use of a bow-and-arrow complementary tool set (from
Lombard and Haidle, 2012).
2. Second attention focus: the sheep identifies edible plants
(object)
3. Action 1: feeds on them · · ·
4. Action 2: and becomes full (satisfaction of need).
Option C (extended version)
1. First attention focus, basic need: the sheep (subject)
Subfocus A (referring to subject): notices that the stomach
feels strange/hurts
Subfocus B (referring to subject): “realizes” that it is
hungry
Subfocus C (referring to subject): “knows” that it needs to
eat something
2. Second attention focus: the sheep identifies edible plants
(object)
3. Action 1: bends the neck close to the grass · · ·
4. Action 2: opens the mouth · · ·
5. Action 3: rips off the grass · · ·
6. Action 4: chews the grass · · ·
7. Action 5: tastes whether it is good or not · · ·
8. Action 6: swallows the grass · · ·
9. Action 7: and becomes full.
10. Re-opening of first attention focus, satisfaction of need:
the sheep (subject)
Subfocus A (referring to subject): notices that the stomach
feels better
Subfocus B (referring to subject): “realizes” that the
hunger is gone
Subfocus C (referring to subject): “knows” that it can stop
feeding
Although the grazing-sheep case shows at first sight impres-
sive differences in depiction, the lumping and splitting of sub-
foci/main foci and of operational steps/actions do not really
change the overall picture of main active and passive foci and their
effects on one another. If, however, new elements are added or old
ones are completely omitted (instead of being separated from or
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FIGURE 6 | Cognigram of a chimpanzee using a tool set of chisel and probe to extract termites (after Sanz et al., 2004).
integrated in more comprehensive steps), then real variants of a
problem-solution unit are documented. Commonly, the recon-
structions of prehistoric behavior (E) and the cognigrams as their
graphic representations depict idealized behavioral processes
derived from a multitude of slightly different possibilities. To give
a current example: several observations of brewing coffee with
hot water and a simple paper filter lead to a generalized descrip-
tion of the behavioral process; the planning differences about the
facility used to boil water, whether coffee beans are first ground
in a mill or ready-made powder is used, and the amount of cof-
fee powder taken are not discussed in detail. It depends on the
aim of the analysis if this idealized description is sufficient. The
idealized depiction is sufficient, if you want to compare tradi-
tional German coffee making with simple paper filter with an
Ethiopian coffee ceremony or with the use of a coffee dispenser.
It is not sufficient, if you want to study variability in the behavior
of an individual, small differences within or between groups, or
changes in family traditions of the same behavior “brewing coffee
with a simple paper filter.” For the identification of major leaps
in behavioral concepts in human evolution major changes in the
reconstructed behavioral processes have to be identified. The fun-
damental reconstructions (E) have to be evaluated regarding the
preceding argumentative bridge (A–B–C–D).
The possibility of equifinality, the fact that a problem may be
solved by different means, that a tool may be manufactured and
applied in different ways, raises the question of how convincing
the reconstructions (E) and their graphic representations in cog-
nigrams are. To avoid the possibility of equifinalities, or to discuss
the alternative ways of problem-solution in-depth, the underlying
argumentative bridge (D) has to be given special consideration.
Therefore, technological evidence on the artifact such as traces
of manufacture and use wear, together with data obtained from
experiments or ethnographic analogies have to be thoroughly
described. And it has to be discussed (a) to what extend especially
simpler alternatives of behavioral processes could produce sim-
ilar results, (b) if elements, on which an identification of a leap
is based, are really necessary, and (c) if the contextual evidence
points to the possible or probable parallel application of different
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FIGURE 7 | Cognigram of a Homo sp. producing a simple flake or chopping tool with a hammerstone and using it to dissect a carcass.
ways of solving a problem. Nevertheless, even the most thorough
reconstruction process only remains valid until it is replaced by
a simpler explanation or a hypothesis that comprises more evi-
dence. Equifinality is a problem immanent to all reconstruction
processes; and sometimes no decision for one or the other way of
reconstruction can be taken. Cognigrams, however, help to facil-
itate the discussion about the alternatives in clearly showing the
differences of the reconstructed processes.
BUILDING THE BRIDGE—JOB SITE
With the help of cognigrams and effective chains with which the
bridging (C–D–E) is formalized and illustrated, numerous small
bridges from single artifacts or tool types (A) to the interpreta-
tion (E) can be constructed and set parallel to each other to form
a more load-bearing bridge. If these bridges are set in a chrono-
logical order, it creates a historical perspective and the course
of development becomes visible. This procedure indeed makes
it possible to document the expansion of the causal structure of
agents/agens and effects that accompany the development of tool
behavior in human evolution.
SIMPLE TOOL BEHAVIOR
Simple tool use comprises the application of one or several
tools on one object. The tools can be unmodified or modified
with the help of the subject’s own facilities (Figure 4; for the
variety of simple tool use in animals and the representation
of these behaviors in cognigrams see Haidle, 2012). Basis of a
selective and flexible tool behavior (cf. Seed and Byrne, 2010)
are (a) the inhibition of impulses, (b) a certain perception of
an agent-effect or means-end relation that is applied in a tool-
on-object behavior (for the discussion of the possible range of
perception see below), and (c) a goal-directed manipulation of
the chosen tool. Capuchin monkeys, for example, select hammer-
stones to open nuts according functional features like friability
and weight (Visalberghi et al., 2009). Chimpanzees use different
tool sets (perforators and probes) to extract termites from sub-
terranean and aboveground nests: they choose the suitable means
to get the desired result (opening the different termite nests). In
addition, they search for both elements of the tool sets, perfora-
tors and probes, in advance before approaching the nests (Sanz
et al., 2004) (Figure 6).
MODULAR TOOL BEHAVIOR
An extension of the problem-solution distance beyond the appli-
cation of a set of several simple tools on one target becomes
evident with secondary tool use, the use of tools to produce other
tools to solve a problem (Kitahara-Frisch, 1993). Not only inter-
mediate targets in direct connection to the satisfaction of the basic
need have to be perceived, but also tools have to be prepared in
advance to change the status of an object to become the tool to
solve the problem. Such a chaining of agent-effect relations is
the foundation for the manufacture of stone tool by hominins
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reaching back at least 2.6 million years (Semaw et al., 2003): a
hammerstone and adequate stone nodules as raw material have
to be organized in order to produce cutting tools to process
e.g., animal carcasses (Figure 7). So far, the chaining of differ-
ent agent-effect relations has not been observed in animals in the
wild. Experiments with capuchin monkeys imply that this species
is able to understand the relationship between two items (tool
and food object), but lacks the understanding of the relationship
between three items (Fujita et al., 2003), a necessary condition
of secondary tool use. Associated with the use of secondary tools
is the chunking of parts of the tool behavior into independent
behavioral units, which can be combined in different ways to act
on and modify one another. A hammerstone can not only be per-
ceived as a means to solve a basic problem like the exploitation
of hard food resources, but can also be used to solve secondary
problems such as manufacturing of tools. In human evolution,
tool behavior becomes increasingly decoupled from basic needs.
Behavioral units are not exclusively bound to specific and acute
problems. Instead, the elements of behavioral units (stimulus,
concept of solution, goal) are increasingly abstracted from specific
purposes and become applicable in different contexts: a modular
capacity arises. The execution of modular cultural capacities can
occur on various technological levels based on differing knowl-
edge and skills: knapping stone tools with different techniques
only takes a few minutes, yet requires the same modular cultural
capacity as does the manufacture of a simple wooden spear which
is likely to span several days (Haidle, 2010) (Figure 8).
COMPOSITE TOOL BEHAVIOR
New qualities in the perception of agent-effect relations are the
basis of composite tools. In composite tools such as a wooden
spear armed with a stone projectile, the problem-solution dis-
tance is extended to a combination of different behavioral units
with specific qualities (wooden spear with good flight qualities,
projectile point made from stone with good cutting properties,
adhesive and binding material with good fixing potential) that
are fused to form composites with new qualities (composite spear
with increased penetrating power). While tools made out of many
pieces of the same kind, such as a piles of boxes to be used as
a ladder as documented for chimpanzees (cf. Köhler, 1926) or
sophisticated baskets made by humans, only escalate the prop-
erties of the basic element, composite tools demonstrate a new
combination of different qualities. The different elements of a
composite tool “may be obtained at different times and in dif-
ferent places” (Ambrose, 2010, S139) while the new functional
unit may be assembled much later (Ambrose, 2010). Within
the archeological record, hafted tools and compound adhesives
(Wadley, 2005; Wadley et al., 2009) are typical material examples
of such composites (Figure 9). Early evidence of composite capac-
ity reaches back at least 200,000 years with finds of stone tools
with wear traces of wooden hafts in Africa (Rots and Van Peer,
2006) and stone tools from Neanderthal contexts in Italy fixed
with birch tar to now decomposed handles (Mazza et al., 2006).
COMPLEMENTARY TOOL BEHAVIOR
While the subject generally operates composite tools, comple-
mentary tool sets apply a new aspect of problem-solving with
FIGURE 8 | A sophisticated example of modular tool behavior: a
300,000-year-old wooden spear from Schöningen (Photo: P. Pfarr,
Niedersächsisches Landesamt für Denkmalpflege, Wikimedia
Commons).
a tool controlling or enhancing another tool which provides
the actually desired effect. Bow-and-arrow, needle-and-thread,
screw-and-screwdriver, key-and-lock are only some examples of
the symbiotic relationship of two discrete, but concerted elements
working together to fulfill a common task (Lombard and Haidle,
2012) (Figure 10). Figure 11 shows the cognigram of the appli-
cation of bow-and-arrow for hunting: note here the curly brace
on the effect of the bow-and-arrow set on the prey, indicating
technological symbiosis (for a detailed depiction of all behavioral
modules necessary for bow-and-arrow manufacture see Lombard
and Haidle, 2012; for an overview of foci and effects in the com-
plete process of manufacture and use of a bow-and-arrow see
Figure 5). The elements of a complementary tool set must be
developed and used as acting entities with two or more inter-
dependent and exchangeable parts in complementary correspon-
dence with each other. To solve a problem with a complementary
tool set two different agent-effect relations have to be taken into
account, which are released by only one action of the subject: the
acting individual draws the bowstring, for example, and lets it
go, which propels the arrow, and the arrow consequently pen-
etrates the prey in order to hurt or kill it. The impulse for the
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FIGURE 9 | Cognigram of the production of compound adhesive: note
the fusion of resin and ocher (plus sign) becoming a new attention focus
“adhesive” (after Wadley, 2005; Wadley et al., 2009). The production of
compound adhesive is a distinct behavioral module and can be combined
with various other modules as in the production of a bow-and-arrow set (see
also Figure 5) (from Lombard and Haidle, 2012).
goal-directed tool respectively, its effect is given by the control-
ling/enhancing tool of the complementary set and only indirectly
by the subject. As early archeological evidence of complementary
behavioral capacities, stone tips from South African sites are dis-
cussed, which were probably used as projectile points of arrows
and date back to ca. 64,000 years (Lombard, 2011). Eyed needles
and parts of spear-throwers are other archeological finds which
give hints on the use of complementary tool sets between 30,000
and 10,000 years ago.
NOTIONAL TOOL BEHAVIOR
Finally, with notional concepts causal reasoning beyond purely
physical effects of exclusively physical agents/agens has been
introduced. As notional concepts “objects” are defined, which
can be manipulated only in the mind or through imagination,
but can be combined with and may have effects on physical or
other notional modules. Notional concepts can be represented
in (a) the signification of objects/signs (e.g., the meaning of the
cross, a crescent, and the Star of David as symbols of religions),
(b) systems of ideas (e.g., myths, religious beliefs, philosophical
question, constitutions of states) (c) normative definitions (e.g.,
metric and value systems), or (d) virtual beings (e.g., angels), and
characters (e.g., protecting capacities of an amulet). A notional
FIGURE 10 | A complementary tool set: sinew fibers controlled by an
eyed-needle made from bone (Photo: Rudi Walter).
concept as attention focus can be combined with a physical object
to form a composite with new functional qualities emerging out
of the basic physical qualities and a certain meaning. For exam-
ple, a certain signification derived from the European monetary
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1472 | 9
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FIGURE 11 | Cognigram of hunting with a bow-and-arrow-set: note the curly brace indicating technological symbiosis (from Lombard and Haidle,
2012). The hunting process may, of course, be an independent module separate from transport, preparation of a meal, and consumption.
system can be combined with a specific metal object as token to
form a coin with the economic value of 1 C. The value, how-
ever, is neither bound to the material value of the metal object
nor to a specific merchandise value. Currency can be overval-
ued or devalued; this manipulation is primarily non-physical,
although in a secondary step it has influence on the physical world
indeed (Figure 12). However, there are also notional concepts,
which are not linked to physical objects such as significations
linked to an object to form a sign/symbol, but are independent
operational foci as the ideas of “justice,” “reincarnation,” or the
“devil.” Of course, the idea of “justice” is triggered by human
experiences in the real world, but it is an abstract notion that
can be discussed in philosophical disputes without referring to
physical manifestations. Due to their nature, the detection of
notional concepts or mental representations within the archeo-
logical record is difficult. If not explicitly described in written
historical sources, notional concepts can only be vaguely traced
from the context or tools with which they have formed com-
posites or complementary sets. The best material expressions
of notional behavioral capacities are unambiguous information
carriers associated with the notional component like notations
detailed and numerous enough to identify the underlying system,
as for example alphabetical letters, Roman or Arabic numerical
signs, or Incan quipus, a recording system using knots in sets
of strings. In these cases, the depicted signs such as the letter
X or the numeral 4 are physical components of a composite
tool, which receives its individual qualities in combination with
a mental notion. Early evidence of notional concepts are artis-
tic representations of probably metaphysical beings such as the
ca. 32,000-year-old lion-man from the Hohlestein-Stadel cave in
South Germany (Figure 13) (cf. Wynn et al., 2009). For other
artistic artifacts such as the ivory figurines from caves of the
Swabian Jura (Conard, 2009) or parietal art in France (Vialou,
1987; Clottes, 2001), be it figurative, abstract or ornamental, a
notional component is often assumed, but cannot be proven (cf.
Malafouris, 2007).
EXPANSION OF PROBLEM-SOLUTION DISTANCES AND OF CULTURAL
CAPACITIES
The expansion of the problem-solution distance regarding agents
and effects as described above is associated with an expansion of
cultural capacities in human evolution. Cultural behavior is a sub-
set of behavior in general, defined by a historical-social dimen-
sion of development additional to the biological and individual
dimensions more or less active also in other forms of behavior
(Haidle and Conard, 2011; Haidle et al., under review). Advanced
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FIGURE 12 | Simplified cognigram of the creation of a piece of money with shared value. Note the N-Focus of the notional concept of a certain value as
significant fused (plus sign) with a specific token to become a new attention focus “piece of money.”
tool behavior with an extended problem-solution distance is
commonly not invented individually again and again, but at least
some information is passively provided or actively handed down
(historical aspect) by other, though not necessarily cognate mem-
bers of the group (social aspect). Regarding the limited time
for learning in an individual life span, the possibility to adopt
knowledge and practices from other individuals becomes more
important, as the problem-solution distances in single tool behav-
ior become more complex and more different tools are used
in various spheres of life. Associated with the expansion of the
problem-solution distance in human evolution, the impact of the
historical-social dimension to the development of (tool) behavior
increases regarding the transmission of information, but also con-
cerning the scope of application. Artifacts with notional aspects
unfold their full potential only if they are used within a group
that shares that notion.
The different tool behaviors in hominins, and with it the
handling of agents/agens and effects to satisfy individual needs,
can generally be taken as different cultural performances with
interrelated biological, individual and historical-social aspects of
development embedded within a specific environment/resource
space (Haidle and Conard, 2011; Haidle et al., under review)
(Figure 14). The biological dimension refers to the biological
potential and constraints for behavior given in genes, gene expres-
sions, anatomical blueprints and physiological standards of a
group of organisms and is expressed, for example, in the struc-
ture of the nervous system and the brain, in sensory perception,
in motor and articulation skills, in the form of sociality, and in
the principle abilities to communicate. The individual dimension
of behavior reflects individuals’ preferences, aversions, skills, and
disabilities. The individual dimension incorporates the potential
and constraints of an individual, or of a group of individuals,
set by individual talents or poor aptitudes, by the personal social
setting and by individual life histories of physical, mental, and
emotional experiences. The historical-social dimension represents
historical and social potentials and constraints. The set of histori-
cally acquired knowledge and skills, customs, views and opinions,
and the social access to it, makes up a part of the individual’s
environment that can be acted on, and used as a basis for fur-
ther innovation. The forms and extent of storage, transmission,
permutation, and transformation of the knowledge and skills,
customs, views, and opinions support or hamper the unfolding
of cultural performances. The three dimensions are multifac-
torial and interdependent with each other and the embedding
environment. This specific environment comprises conspecifics
and other agents/agens and objects. The conspecifics, agents and
objects are linked to the organisms in focus by functional rela-
tions effective within a certain time depth. The analysis of the
developmental aspects of a specific behavior is thus difficult,
and the identification of some factors should not entail the
conclusion that all factors are understood. The same is likely
to be true also for the cognitive background of the behavioral
performances.
BUILDING THE BRIDGE—SNAG LIST
Numerous micro-theories helped to build parallel bridges from
prehistoric finds to the archeological reconstructions of the activ-
ities, knowledge, and conceptions behind the manufacture and
use of the tools (A–B–C–D–E). They can be set in chronological
order and viewed from a problem-solution distance perspective
to get an impression of the development of the handling of agents
and effects in tool behavior in the course of human evolution. The
final bridge arches that connect the archeological reconstructions
with their possible causal-cognitive background (E–F–G–H–I)
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FIGURE 13 | The ivory figurine of the lion-man from Hohlenstein-
Stadel, probably representing a virtual being (Photo: Dagmar
Hollmann, Wikimedia Commons).
are still only in the project phase. Two main factors hamper the
construction progress.
• Interpretation of the reconstructions: The coding of tool
behavior in cognigrams/effective chains provides a breakdown
of involved agents and their summarized effects and illus-
trates the implicit causal structure of a certain behavior. Yet,
controlled laboratory experiments with non-human primates
and different species of crows show the difficulties of deter-
mining (a) which features of an agent are perceived to cause
the effect, (b) the understanding of how causes produce their
effects (based on which physical mechanisms), and (c) which
cognitive processes are active (e.g., Limongelli et al., 1995;
Bird and Emery, 2009; Emery and Clayton, 2009; Taylor et al.,
2012; for an overview see Penn and Povinelli, 2007, pp. 107–
111). If it is difficult to assess to which extent a capuchin
monkey or a chimpanzee understands the causal role of dif-
ferent features of a tool, the more this is true for the behav-
ior/cognition of extinct hominin species. To prevent possible
over-interpretation of the data, minimal explanations have to
be looked for. Instead of awarding non-human primates with
the capacity “to distinguish causally relevant from causally
irrelevant properties of a tool and thus possess a ‘functional
concept of artifacts”’ (Penn and Povinelli, 2007, p. 107), Penn
and Povinelli, for example, present “a more modest hypothesis;
i.e., non-human primates are predisposed to perceive certain
clusters of features as more salient than others when select-
ing among potential tools without understanding anything
about the underlying causal mechanisms involved” (Penn and
Povinelli, 2007, p. 108).
• Cognitive theory: from an archeologist’s perspective, a com-
prehensive and discrete psychological model about causal rea-
soning and its development seems to be lacking so far, and the
neural mechanisms specifically supporting causal reasoning are
poorly understood (cf. Penn and Povinelli, 2007; Osiurak et al.,
2010; Vaesen, 2012, pp. 204–206). Although marked progress
has been made in the last years in the study of neural mech-
anisms related to tool behavior in Homo sapiens such as the
functional reorganization of visuotactile limb representations
(Maravita and Iriki, 2004), the role and development of spe-
cific sectors of the parietal (Goldenberg and Spatt, 2009; Peeters
et al., 2009; Bruner, 2010), and functionally specialized net-
works involving temporal, parietal and frontal areas within the
left cerebral hemisphere (Johnson-Frey, 2004), “to date there
are remarkably little data concerning the neural bases of pro-
cesses required to understand physical causality of the sort
necessary for complex tool use” (Johnson-Frey, 2003, p. 203).
Thus, the final bridging (E–F–G–H–I) for causal reasoning can
only be the fragile attempt of a temporary bridge until more
stable construction elements are provided from the side of cog-
nitive sciences. A good example of the potential of a successful
bridging from archeological evidence to cognitive models is the
Extended Working Memory hypothesis (Wynn and Coolidge,
2011).
BUILDING THE BRIDGE—SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT
Tool use, in most cases a cultural behavior, is commonly associ-
ated with aspects of causal cognition at least in the simplest form
of understanding a causal structure. Furthermore, this under-
standing of an agent-effect relationship is not only retrospective,
but also prospective in its application on new tasks. The man-
ufacture of a tool fitting to a specific task additionally requires
an identification of certain qualities of the tool to be gained
by the modification in order to solve the basic problem (Hunt
et al., 2006). Whether all necessary and sufficient qualities of the
tool within the specific task are completely understood is not
important; the modification of certain characteristics implies a
basic causal reasoning. The basic cognitive faculties are not spe-
cific adaptations for tool behavior but domain-general cognitive
capacities as experiments with rooks show, a bird species that
does not use tools in the wild but appears to possess an under-
standing of tools (Bird and Emery, 2009). However, experiments
with chimpanzees demonstrate special cognitive affordances of
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FIGURE 14 | The three dimensions of cultural performances (biological, historical-social, and individual with attached developmental processes)
embedded in and interdependent (⇔) with the specific environment (from Haidle and Conard, 2011).
tool use that may obscure causal cognitive efforts. Variations of
the trap-tube problem with and without tools show that “even a
simple tool-using task is likely to place a load on the attentional
system, because unlike the automatic movements of the hands,
manipulating a tool to bring about an effective action will require
increased attention. The amount needed is likely to depend on
the complexity of the task, and the degree of familiarity with the
tool-using action required. Moreover, the need to split attentional
focus between the end of the tool that is held by the chimpanzee,
the end that contacts the food, and any relevant features of the
substrate on or in which the food rests (such as a trap) may be a
further challenge” (Seed et al., 2009, p. 33).
The examination of the problem-solution distance with the
help of cognigrams and effective chains allow us to reconstruct
the causal structures in tool behavior and provides starting points
for bridging the gap to the identification of (causal) cognitive
capacities underlying different forms of tool behavior. Simple
tool behavior in general requires at least minimal forms of inhi-
bition, allowing a shift of the focus from the desired goal to
a means to reach the target. The means are not chosen com-
pletely arbitrarily, but selected for a set of (necessary and random)
features providing an approach to achieve the aim. The man-
ufacture of tools is commonly directed to improve the tool’s
quality to help to satisfy the need. Modular tool behavior based
on secondary tool use requires an understanding and application
of causal chains. While 15-month-old children are able to under-
stand causal chains (Cohen et al., 1999), capuchin monkeys e.g.,
understand only spatial relationships between two, but not three
items (Fujita et al., 2003). It can be hypothesized that such a con-
straint is also active in chimpanzees, the most proficient tool users
beside humans, which show the conception and use of sophisti-
cated tool sets applied one after the other to the same target, but
no chaining of a tool to produce another tool to achieve an aim
which seems to be exclusive to hominins. The individual case of
the bonobo Kanzi (Schick et al., 1999) who learned to produce
flake tools with a hammerstone may simply show how years of
training skills acquired in a historical-social setting from experi-
enced individuals (here humans) can help to overcome cognitive
limits. Composite tool behavior also requires the combination of
different tools with different qualities. Instead of being applied in
a causal sequence, however, the tools with different qualities joint
in a composite tool unfold their effects together and interdepen-
dently to reach the target. In modular as well as in composite
tool behavior the subject triggers the application of each tool
in a sequence independently. In complementary tool behavior, in
contrast, only the controlling part of the tool set is activated,
which then gives an impulse on the other part of the tool set in
order to achieve the desired aim. To conceptualize and produce
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a functional complementary tool set the application of a subject-
independent trigger extends the necessary causal understanding.
Notional tool behavior, finally, requires abstract causal reason-
ing about not observable agents and their effects. Though also
New Caledonian crows reason about hidden causal agents (Taylor
et al., 2012), it is unclear what the animals expect to be the causal
agent. In notional tool behavior the subject does not only look for
hidden causal agents, but mental representations as tools respec-
tively, components of tools are applied. Penn and Povinelli (2007,
p. 111) emphasize a strong relationship of abstract causal reason-
ing with analogical reasoning. Vaesen (2012, p. 266) summarizes
that “causal thought involves both the ability to infer causal mech-
anisms relating cause-effect covariances (i.e., inferential causal
reasoning) and the ability to recognize that such mechanisms
underpin causally analogous events (i.e., analogical causal reason-
ing). Current evidence suggests that chimpanzees perform rather
modestly in both respects. Humans, in contrast, have a drive
for seeking and generalizing causal explanations, and often learn
about causality through their own diagnostic interventions—
a behavior not yet observed in the great apes.” Additionally,
Homo sapiens is able to conceptualize mental representations as
agents/agens.
The studies on prehistoric tool behavior presented above
strongly suggest a multi-leg evolution of several components of
causal cognition and adjacent cognitive features. Additionally, the
development of the different cultural performances of tool behav-
ior is not only based on biological and individual factors, but also
on historical-social factors. The three dimensions are multifacto-
rial, interdependent, and embedded in the specific environment
of the population (Haidle and Conard, 2011). The same can be
assumed for the different performances in the cognitive sphere. A
cultural performance may have different cognitive backgrounds.
Prior individual experience helps to manage a new task (von
Bayern et al., 2009); historical-socially transmitted experience of
other individuals in cultural context can do the same. If trained by
a knowledgeable individual, naïve individuals may perform very
well in a lot of problem settings also with sophisticated tools, and
without understanding the basic causal relations. Consequently,
not all individuals in a group with cultural behavior have to
share the same cognitive capacities to perform in some aspects
in the same cultural way. And with the same cultural capac-
ities of problem-solving different individuals and populations
may perform very differently. I assume that the cultural back-
ground, respectively the historical-social dimension also shapes
the cognitive performances behind the behavior. There are no
data available about past human cognition. But with the help of
argumentative bridges at least some impressions on the evolution
of causal cognition can be gained from prehistoric artifacts.
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